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I.

INTRODUCTION

The legislative history of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 1 (Reform Act) reads like Armageddon. To its opponents, the
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I. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (Reform Act), Pub. L. No.
104-67, 109 Stat. 737, 744 (1995)(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.A.) (West Supp. 1996) (amending the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act), 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb (1994 & West Supp. 1996) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-l/(1994 & West Supp. 1996)).
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Reform Act "was conceived in sin."2 Proponents countered that it was
a necessary check on "lawyer's greed."3 Notwithstanding the venom of
the debate, the Reform Act cleared the House and the Senate with
substantial bipartisan support. 4 President Clinton responded--literally
in the eleventh hour-with a veto and his first substantive comment on
the legislation. 5 Within days, both houses of Congress responded with
more than enough votes to record the first override of this President's
veto. 6
This Article looks beyond the political hyperbole to consider the
practical implications of the Reform Act. While the primary purpose of
the Reform Act is to revamp the process by which private claims are
asserted under the federal securities laws, the implications of the
legislation extend far beyond the litigation battlefields. There is little in
the Reform Act's legislative history to guide practitioners or their clients
on how they should adapt to the legislation.
This paucity of guidance exists even with those aspects of the
legislation that were bitterly contested throughout the legislative process.
There was, for example, intense debate about the merits and form of a
"safe harbor" for predictive statements. 7 Scant practical guidance
emerged from this debate to direct companies on what form their
disclosure should take to secure the protection of the safe harbor. Other
important issues garnered even less attention in the congressional
debates. For example, by imposing a statutory "whistle-blowing"
obligation on public company auditors, the Reform Act has altered the
relationship between companies and their accountants. There exists no
concrete guidance on the day-to-day response to obligations that now are
imposed by statute.
Similarly, the congressional record reflects
considerable concern about the litigation risks confronted by public
company directors. Individual directors, however, cannot look to the
statute or its legislative history for a blueprint on how their boards
should respond to the legislation. Finally, the legislation mirrors a
premise that shareholder class litigation would operate more effectively

2. 141 CONG. REC. Hl4033 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1995) (statement of Rep. John
Dingell).
3. See id. at HI 4038 (statement of Rep. Christopher Cox).
4. The House of Representatives passed the legislation by a 320-102 vote. See
id. at Hl4055. In the Senate, the margin was 65-30. See 141 CONG. REC. Sl7997
(daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995).
5. See Michael K. Frisby & Jeffrey Taylor, Clinton Vetoes Bill Limiting Securities
Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 1995, at A3.
6. Jeffrey Taylor, House Votes to Override Veto ofSecurities-Suit Bill, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 21, 1995, at A3; Jeffrey Taylor, Congress Sends Business a Christmas Gift,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 1995, at A2.
7. See 141 CONG. REC. SI075-91 (daily ed. Jan. 18, 1995).
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if it was supervised by institutional investors. Significant shareholders
now must consider whether (and when) they elect to assume that cudgel.
Since the Reform Act targets shortcomings in the administration of
private actions under the federal securities law, there is a temptation to
focus singularly on the statute's effect on securities litigation. At any
given moment, however, only a small subset of public companies are
enmeshed in securities litigation. By contrast, the general counselling
questions outlined above are relevant to all companies. This Article
suggests approaches that can be taken in addressing these pragmatic
concerns.

IL

THE

REFORMS

The Reform Act's passage was driven by a familiar image. It began
with an adverse announcement by a public company which produced a
quick drop in the company's stock price. Within days------sometimes
within hours------shareholder class action complaints were filed alleging
that earlier statements of optimism by the company or its executives
constituted securities fraud. Confronted with costly litigation and
potentially crippling liability, the vast majority of defendants settled.
Investors recouped a small percentage of their alleged damages and,
directly or indirectly, paid both plaintiffs' counsel and the lawyers
defending the company. 8
While this litigation often was initiated with limited time for
reflection, the suits were not inconsequential. The Supreme Court
recently noted that litigation under the federal securities laws "presents
a danger of vexatiousness different in degree and in kind from that
which accompanies litigation in general."9 In crafting legislative relief

8. See Securities Litigation Reform Proposals: Hearings on S.240 and S.667
Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1995) (statement of Senator Pete V.
Domenici) (expressing his skepticism that attorneys could perform the necessary due
diligence and research into the merits of such cases in 48 hours). See also Milt Policzer,
They've Cornered the Market; A Few Firms Dominate the Derivative-Suit Arena, NAT'L
L.J., Apr. 27, 1992, at I (study of 46 securities class actions reveals that one-quarter
were filed within one day of an adverse announcement and another 30 were filed within
one week).
9. Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 189
(1994) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975)).
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from abuses associated with litigation, the Reform Act introduces a
panoply of reforms. Four are particularly noteworthy.
First, the legislation attempts to interpose a real "client" into securities
class action litigation. One of the enduring criticisms of securities class
action litigation was that figurehead plaintiffs routinely exercised no
meaningful control over the litigation--or even the decision to file
suit. 10 The legislative history reflects congressional acceptance of the
commentary suggesting that this litigation would function more
effectively if it was supervised by institutional shareholders.11 As a
result, in class action claims asserted under the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act) 12 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act), 13 the court is now required to appoint as lead plaintiff "the
member ... of the purported plaintiff class that the court determines to
be most capable of adequately representing the interests of class
members . . .. " 14 The legislation explicitly creates a rebuttable
presumption that the most adequate representative will be the party that
has "the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the class .
15
• • •"
The legislative history reflects the expectation that, under this
system, "the plaintiff will choose counsel rather than, as is true today,
counsel choosing the plaintiff," and having done so, the lead plaintiff
would "exercise supervision and control of the lawyers for the class." 16
Second, the legislation imposes "speed bumps" along what used to be
a race to the courthouse to file securities class actions. Some of these
changes introduced in the Reform Act are ministerial (such as the
requirement that the lead plaintiff certify that he or she has reviewed the
complaint and did not purchase the securities for the purpose of
participating in private litigation). 17 Others, however, are substantive.
For example, complaints alleging violations of the federal securities laws
now are subject to demanding pleading standards. A plaintiff making
10. For example, a William Weinberger has appeared in over 90 shareholder suits.
Two years after Weinberger's death in 1991, Cipher Data Corporation was still battling
the notorious plaintiff. Jack Sweeney, Busy Plaintiffs Keep Silicon Valley on Edge,
COMPUTER RESELLER NEWS, Nov. 28, 1994, at I.
11. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 369, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1995) [hereinafter
CONFERENCE REPORT] (citing Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do

the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities
Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053 (1995)).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 77aa-bbbb (1994 & West Supp. 1996).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 78a-ll (1994 & West Supp. 1996).
14. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78-u (West Supp. 1996) (adding new § 21D(a)(3)(B)(i) to the
Exchange Act).
15. Id. (adding new§ 21D(a)(3)(b)(iii) to the Exchange Act).
16. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 32, 35.
17. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4 (West Supp. 1996) (adding new§ 21D(a)(2)(A)(ii) to the
Exchange Act).
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allegations of fraudulent disclosure violations must specify (1) each
statement alleged to be misleading, (2) the reasons the statement is
misleading, and (3) to the extent that an allegation is made on "information and belief," the complaint must detail with particularity all the facts
on which that belief is formed. 18 Moreover, the Reform Act also
requires a plaintiff to "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 19
Third, the legislation seeks to shelter the disclosure of "soft" or
forward-looking information. Predictive statements are the grist of much
securities litigation. This threat of securities litigation chilled the flow
of information. 20 With the Reform Act, Congress has tried to mitigate
the litigation risk and foster the disclosure of forward-looking information.
Safe harbors incorporated into new section 27 A of the Securities Act
and section 21E of the Exchange Act provide a measure of protection for
predictive statements. A forward-looking statement is defined in the safe
harbor provisions to include projections (for example, of revenues,
earnings, or losses), "plans and objectives of management for future
operations," and statements of future economic performance (including
analyses mandated by SEC filing requirements).2 1 Typically, these
statements are isolated in shareholder litigation if any prove to be less
than perfectly prescient. Material forward-looking statements will be
shielded by the safe harbor provided that (I) they are identified as such,
and (2) they are "accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements
identifying important factors that could cause actual results to differ
materially from those in the forward-looking statement."22 Even in the
absence of cautionary language, a plaintiff bears the burden of proving
that the statement was made with "actual knowledge" that it was false
or misleading. 23

18. Id. (adding new§ 21D(b)(I) to the Exchange Act).
19. Id. (adding new§ 21D(b)(2) to the Exchange Act).
20. During the hearings on the Reform Act, James F. Morgan of the National
Venture Capital Association testified that over two-thirds of venture capital firms were
reluctant to discuss their performance with analysts or the public because of the threat
of litigation. S. REP. No. 98, 104th Cong., !st Sess. 16 (1995).
21. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-5 (West Supp. 1996) (adding new§ 21E(i)(l)(A)-(C) to the
Exchange Act).
22. Id. (adding new§ 21E(c)(l)(A)(i) to the Exchange Act).
23. Id. (adding new§ 21E(c)(l)(B) to the Exchange Act).
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While the safe harbor is a welcome change in the law, it is pockmarked with exceptions. For example, it does not extend to forwardlooking statements made in connection with initial public offerings,
tender offers, section 13(d) disclosures, going private transactions, rollup transactions, or financial statements. Similarly, issuers excluded from
the safe harbor's protection include partnerships, limited liability
companies, investment companies, issuers of penny stock, or companies
that, in the prior three years, were the subject of judicial or administrative decrees prohibiting further violations of the antifraud provisions,
whether entered after litigation, or upon consent. 24
Finally, the Reform Act limits the exposure of so-called "deep pocket"
defendants. The Reform Act's legislative history identified as "[o ]ne of
the most manifestly unfair aspects of the current system of [private]
securities litigation," the application of joint and several liability
principles under which "a single defendant who has been found to be 1%
liable may be forced to pay 100% of the damages in the case."25 The
Reform Act generally limits joint and several liability for violations of
the Exchange Act to defendants who participated "knowingly" in the
misconduct. 26 The exposure of most other defendants is limited to their
proportionate fault. 27
This relief was achieved through an important tradeoff. The Reform
Act imposes upon independent outside auditors, under new section IOA
of the Exchange Act, the obligation to employ audit procedures designed
to detect illegal conduct by their clients. Auditors must inform
management of any illegal act--defined broadly to include "an act or
omission that violates any law, or any rule having the force of
law"---unless the act is "clearly inconsequential."28 If management
fails to respond "appropriate[ly]," if the illegal conduct will have a
material impact on the company's financial statements, and if failure to
take corrective action will lead to a non-standard audit report or the
auditor's resignation, then the auditors must submit a report to the
board. 29 The board, in tum, is obligated to tum the report over to the

24. Id. (adding new§ 21E(b) to the Exchange Act).
25. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 37.
26. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4 (West Supp. 1996) (adding new§ 21D(g)(2)(A) to the
Exchange Act).
27. The Reform Act preserves joint and several liability for damages owed to a
plaintiff with a net worth below $200,000 when that plaintiff's damages exceed I 0% of
the plaintiff's net worth. Solvent defendants assume proportionate responsibility for the
"uncollectible share" up to 50% of their proportionate damages. Id. (adding new
§ 21D(g)(4) to the Exchange Act).
28. Id. § 78j-l (adding new§ I0A(f) to the Exchange Act).
29. Id. (adding new§ I0A(b)(2)(A)-(C) to the Exchange Act).
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Securities Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) and, failing that,
the auditor must make disclosure to the SEC and resign the engagement. 30
III.

DISCLOSURE PRACTICES AFTER THE REFORM ACT

The statutory safe harbor formulated by Congress in the Reform Act
has added to the importance of the process by which a company's
disclosure documents are crafted. If counsel has crafted disclosure that
highlights the important risk factors that relate to predictive statements,
such disclosure can facilitate the prompt dismissal of actions based on
these statements. The utility of the safe harbor will be enhanced if
federal courts implement the legislative intent to limit significantly any
discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending.31 Accordingly,
companies should consider four principles when preparing their postReform Act disclosure.

A.

Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information Should Be
Tailored to Meet the Requirements of the Statutory
Safe Harbor for Such Statements

There exists no clear delineation of what constitutes a "meaningful
cautionary statement."32 For purposes of the safe harbor, the legislative
history notes that companies relying on the safe harbor must "identify
important factors that could cause results to differ materially-but not

30. Id. (adding new§ I0A(b)(3) to the Exchange Act).
31. As one of the modifications introduced by the Reform Act,§ 21D(b)(3)(B) of
the Exchange Act now requires that in any private action, "all discovery and other
proceedings shall be stayed during the pending of any motion to dismiss, unless the court
finds ... that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent
undue prejudice to that party." Id. § 78u-4 (adding new§ 21D(b)(3)(B) to the Exchange
Act). The first reported decision addressing this provision applied the limitation strictly.
The court held that a plaintiff in an injunctive action alleging violations of section 13(d)
of the Exchange Act failed to meet the statutory threshold of undue prejudice when the
defendant's motion to dismiss was deemed to preclude the expedited discovery sought
by the plaintiff. See Medical Imaging Ctrs. of America, Inc. v. Lichenstein, 917 F.
Supp. 717, 721-22 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
32. See, e.g., Margaret A. Jacobs & Edward Felsenthal, Securities Bill May Prompt
New Litigation, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 1995, at B2 (while "there is no term more
ambiguous than a 'meaningful relationship,"'... "the phrase 'meaningful cautionary
statement' is a close second.") (quoting the statement of Professor John C. Coffee of
Columbia Law School).
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all factors." 33 Specifically, the "[f]ailure to include the particular factor
that ultimately causes the forward-looking statement not to come true
will not mean that the statement is not protected by the safe harbor. "34
While the legislative history is clear on this point, it provides little
direction to counsel who must identify important factors that could cause
actual results to differ.
The best guidance may exist not in the legislative history but in a
growing body of case law applying the "bespeaks caution" doctrine.
This judicially-created doctrine articulates the common sense proposition
that forward-looking statements are not fraudulent when they are
accompanied by appropriate cautionary language. From its germination
in a footnote to a 1977 Eighth Circuit case, 35 the doctrine has been
adopted, in one form or another, by the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth,
Ninth, and Eleventh circuits. 36 The Reform Act's legislative history
notes that the safe harbor "is based on aspects of SEC Rule 175 and the
judicial[ly] created 'bespeaks caution' doctrine." 37
In each case, the bespeaks caution analysis turns on a fact-intensive
analysis. Nonetheless, these cases and the Reform Act's legislative
history suggest several guidelines for crafting meaningful cautionary
statements in the wake of the Reform Act.
1.

The Cautionary Language Must Be Tailored to the
Forward-Looking Information

The Reform Act's legislative history cautions that "boilerplate
warnings will not suffice as meaningful cautionary statements." 38
Bespeaks caution cases have emphasized that warnings must be
"substantive and tailored to the specific future projections, estimates or

33. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 44.
34. Id.
35. Polin v. Conductron Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 806 n.28 (8th Cir. 1977) ("The terms
thus employed bespeak caution in outlook and fall far short of the assurances required
for a finding of falsity and fraud."). See also Moorhead v. Merrill Lynch, 949 F.2d 243
(8th Cir. I 99 I).
36. See, e.g., Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875 {1st Cir. 1991);
I. Meyer Pincus & Assoc. v. Oppenheimer & Co., 936 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991); In re
Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, I 14 S. Ct.
1219 (1994); Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994); Sinay v. Lamson &
Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037 (6th Cir. 1991); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35
F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 277 (1995); Saltzberg v. TM
Sterling/Austin Assoc., Ltd., 45 F.3d 399 (I Ith Cir. 1995).
37. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 43.
38. id.
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opinions" that are coming under scrutiny. 39 These cases suggest, for
example, that a company touting a new product should disclose
information about the competitive forces that would impact the product's
success. 40 Similarly, it is prudent to temper predictions of earnings
growth with a cautionary note about the adverse impact that would inure
from the loss of a significant customer. 41 In the same vein, companies
have benefited from warnings of pending legislative action that, should
it materialize, would limit the company's capacity to operate at
management's expectations. 42

2.

Risk Disclosure Should Convey the Magnitude of the
Risk-Not Just That It Exists

When defendants are unsuccessful in their efforts to invoke the
bespeaks caution doctrine, courts often emphasize that the disclosure did
not present a complete picture of the risk involved. A cautionary note
that results would hinge on the successful integration of an acquired
company may be insufficient if it fails to outline what integration
problems are confronted. 43
Similarly, a pharmaceutical company
predicting success for a new product should do more than simply note
that governmental approval is beyond its control. Instead, the disclosure
should, to the extent possible, enable investors to assess any potential
impediments to approval. 44 If the consummation of a proposed

39. Trump, 7 F.3d at 371-72. See also Saltzberg, 45 F.3d at 400 ("The cautionary
language used in the private placement memorandum in this case was . . . explicit,
repetitive and linked to the projections about which plaintiffs complain.").
40. See, e.g., In re Quarterdeck Office Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 854 F. Supp. 1466,
1471 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (failure to disclose possible competitive impact of Microsoft Inc.
products rendered immaterial by warnings about the competitive forces that the
company's products were and would be facing).
41. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Novo Industri A/S, 658 F. Supp. 795, 798 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (disclosure included warning that primary customer may not be purchaser from
the issuer to the extent of its prior purchases).
42. See, e.g.. Pache v. Wallace, [\ 994-95 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ,r 98,643, at 91,968 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 1995).
43. See, e.g., Burstein v. Applied Extrusion Technologies, Inc., 150 F.R.D. 433,
443 (D. Mass. 1993).
44. Marion Merrell Dow, Inc. Sec. Litig., [1993-94 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ,I 97,776, at 97,763 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 4, 1993) (issuer did not disclose reports
of deaths and cardiovascular incidents linked to product awaiting governmental
approval).
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transaction is linked closely to a particular type of financing, this aspect
of the transaction should be disclosed. 45
3.

The Warnings Should Be Prominent

As a drafting principle, counsel should ensure that the language that
bespeaks caution is easy to find and easy to understand. Courts are
skeptical of claims that the cautionary language was mired in fine print
when, in reality, it was set forth prominently in a "risk factors"
section. 46 That is not to say that the statements must be placed side-byside. In one case, cautionary language separated by twenty pages from
optimistic statements was deemed sufficient because the warnings were
cross-referenced. 47
4.

If the Forward-Looking Statement is Based on Certain
Assumptions, Those Assumptions Should Be Disclosed

The safe harbor's definition of a forward-looking statement includes
"any statement of the assumptions underlying a projection or outline of
management's plans.'"' 8 The bespeaks caution case law suggests that
companies should outline the basis on which they are making predictions. For example, if an earnings prediction contemplates an improving
economy or increased tourism, such assumptions should be disclosed. 49
Similarly, if projections are based on assumptions specific to the
company, those assumptions should be discussed whenever possible. 50
Some issuers have addressed this issue not only by discussing the

45. Peregrine Options Inc. v. Farley, [1994-95 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 'lj 98,313, at 90,181 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 1994) (noting the importance of high-yield
debt financing).
46. In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 814 F. Supp. 850, 860 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(risk factors section "is not buried beneath other, more optimistic language. On the
contrary, it appears as the first major subsection of the document"), ajf'd in relevant
part, 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. l 994).
47. I. Meyer Pincus & Assoc., P.C. v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 936 F.2d 759,
763 (2d Cir. 1991).
48. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-2 (West Supp. 1996) (adding new § 27A(i)(l)(D) to the
Securities Act).
49. See. e.g.. Funnan v. Sherwood, 833 F. Supp. 408, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(optimistic statements about defendant's ferry business were "clearly predicated" on an
economic upturn in Britain and increased demand due to EuroDisney and other
attractions).
50. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Michaels, [1992-93 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 'lj 96,920, at 93,840-4 I (S.D.N. Y. July 22, I992) (prospectus warned that financial
projections were based on hypothetical assumptions with no guarantee that they would
materialize).
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assumptions but also by conceding that they may not be the most
plausible assumptions. 51
Each company must develop a methodology to ensure that the realities
of the marketplace are being reflected in its disclosure documents. One
litmus test would be to ensure that at least one nonlawyer who is
familiar with the company's business environment reviews the risk
disclosure to ensure that it addresses the risks that he or she thinks about
on a regular basis.

B.

Companies Also Should "Bespeak Caution" in
Their Oral Communications

An important contribution of the Reform Act is that it extends the
protection of the safe harbor to oral forward-looking statements. The
safe harbor extends to forward-looking oral statements if they are
identified as such and if there is a cautionary statement that actual results
might differ. The safe harbor does not require the speaker to identify
important factors that could undermine predictions; it affords the speaker
the opportunity to refer to a "readily available written document" that
outlines the risks in greater detail. 52
This innovation is important because some companies address
forward-looking information in analyst conference calls and other
presentations. 53 This information often is communicated throughout the
marketplace and becomes part of the mix of information relating to the
issuer. Although the safe harbor reflects emerging trends in the case
Jaw, 54 senior managers are well advised to address the most pertinent
risk factors in any public discussion of projections or other forwardlooking information. Recent cases from the Fourth and Sixth Circuits
have extended the bespeaks caution doctrine to oral communications
when appropriate safeguards were taken. 55 Although the law now

51. See Kushner v. DBG Property Investors, Inc., 793. F. Supp. 1161, 1175
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (The prospectus warned that projections "are an illustration of financial
results based on assumptions which are not necessarily the most likely.").
52. See \5 U.S.C.A. § 77z-2 (West Supp. 1996) (adding new§ 27A(c)(2)(B)(i) to
the Securities Act).
53. See, e.g., Randall Smith, Conference Calls to Big Investors Often Leave Little
Guys Hung Up, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1995, at Cl.
54. Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, 991 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1993).
55. See, e.g., Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1039-40 (6th Cir.
1991) (statement by defendant company's chairman that he "does not quarrel" with
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allows the spokesperson to refer an audience to the risk factors section
in a prospectus, companies should consider a practice of addressing
important risk considerations any time that forward-looking information
is discussed, to the extent that it is practical.
C.

Counsel Should Create a Record Reflecting the
Resolution of Difficult Disclosure Issues

At some point, every company faces the difficult question of whether
a particular disclosure should be made and, if so, in what way. There
is an advantage to companies that ensure that the record reflects a
reasoned deliberation prior to the disclosure.
This advice is particularly applicable to forward-looking statements.
The second prong of the statutory safe harbor requires plaintiffs to
demonstrate that statements were made with "actual knowledge" that
they were "false or misleading. " 56 The safe harbor suggests that,
notwithstanding the discovery stay imposed upon motions to dismiss,
"discovery that is specifically directed to the applicability of the
exemption" may be allowed. While the legislative history is clear that
discovery should be limited, 57 courts will be reluctant to dismiss,
without some inquiry, claims that companies and their executives lied to
their investors. A contemporaneous record that the disclosure was
reached after a reasoned consideration will make it more difficult to
sustain such allegations. This drill will pay dividends beyond the realm
of forward-looking statements because when they make allegations of

analyst earnings estimates was tempered by statements that the market was experiencing
a slowdown and there might be lower demand due to higher interest rates); Herman v.
Legent Corp., (1994-95 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 'lj 98,650, at 92,007 (4th Cir.
I 995) (holding that a CEO's comments in an analyst conference call are not actionable
when accompanied with an acknowledgment that the company had difficulty in
forecasting earnings).
56. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-5 (West Supp. 1996) (adding new§ 21E(c)(l)(B) to the
Exchange Act). The provision provides that if the statement is made by a natural
person, plaintiffs must establish that the statement was made "with actual knowledge that
the statement was false or misleading .... " Id. (adding new§ 21E(c)(l)(B)(i) to the
Exchange Act). If the statement is made by a business entity, plaintiffs must allege that
the statement was approved by an "executive officer ... with actual knowledge by that
officer that the statement was false or misleading." Id. (adding new § 2 IE(c)(l )(B)(ii)(I)(II) to the Exchange Act).
57. See, e.g., CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 44 ("The Conference
Committee specifies that the cautionary statements identify 'important' factors to provide
guidance to issuers and not to provide an opportunity for plaintiff[s'] counsel to conduct
discovery on what factors were known to the issuer at the time the forward-looking
statement was made.").
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securities fraud, both private litigants and the SEC must demonstrate that
the defendant acted with scienter. 58

D.

It May Be Prudent to Consider Updating Disclosures-Even in
the Absence of an Affirmative Obligation to Do So

The legislation's drafters took some pains to underscore that "nothing"
in the safe harbor "shall impose upon any person a duty to update a
forward-looking statement."59 In doing so, Congress sidestepped an
issue which has befuddled federal courts for years. To date, several
circuits have offered uniquely ambiguous statements that certain, precise
forward-looking statements may require further disclosure when they are
rendered untrue by subsequent events. 60 The Seventh Circuit recently
rejected this approach, noting that "the securities laws typically do not
act as a Monday Morning Quarterback."61
Regardless of what requirements are imposed as a matter of law, it
often will be prudent to consider updating forward-looking statements.
This will be particularly important if issuers take advantage of the safe
harbor to add more of their own prognostications to the mix of
information.
Several practical considerations will make updates
appropriate in some circumstances. The first is the need to maintain
credibility in the marketplace. An investor relations program will suffer
if stale forward-looking statements are allowed to persist in the
marketplace. Second, the longer that incorrect statements remain
unchanged, the more likely the stock will sustain a substantial price
correction and, as such, create the potential for shareholder litigation.
Finally, it takes only a deft keyboard stroke to allege that a duty to
update was in fact a duty to correct. Courts are less ambivalent about
the duty to correct statements which turn out to have been false when
made. 62

58. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680,691 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 193 (1975).
59. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-5 (West Supp. 1996) (adding new § 21E(d) to the
Exchange Act). The legislative history included merely a single sentence reiterating the
statutory standard. CONFERENCE REPORT ,supra note 11, at 46.
60. See, e.g., In re Time Warner Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993).
61. Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1995).
62. See, e.g., Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1990) (en
bane) ("Obviously, if a disclosure is in fact misleading when made, and the speaker
thereafter learns of this, there is a duty to correct it.").
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IV.

THE REFORM ACT AND THE AUDIT PROCESS

A.

Background: Statutory Audit Requirements

Accounting firms were the Reform Act's earliest and strongest
advocates reflecting years of harsh experience as "deep-pocket"
defendants in private securities litigation. Laventhol & Horwath, once
the nation's seventh largest accounting firm, declared bankruptcy in
1990, due to its litigation exposure. 63 While fears expressed by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants' (AICPA) Public
Oversight Board that other large accounting firms might follow suit did
not materialize, 64 the "Big Six" firms spent over fourteen percent of
their domestic accounting and audit revenues in 1992 on legal matters.65 The need to curtail this litigation explosion was palpable.
By curbing litigation abuses (and, in particular, by replacing joint and
several liability with proportionate liability when accounting firms
typically are sued), the Reform Act should substantially reduce the
profession's litigation costs. The "price" of this reform, however, is
high: New Exchange Act section l0A requires accountants to employ
audit procedures designed to detect illegal acts by their clients and to
report to corporate boards and, in some cases, directly to the SEC, if a
client fails to take "appropriate" remedial action to address auditor
concerns. 66
New section JOA codifies existing auditing standards by requiring
auditors to design and employ audit procedures to permit the detection
of illegal acts by their clients. 67 But, it also fundamentally alters the
63. See Alison L. Cowan, Bankruptcy Filing by Laventho/, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22,
1990, at DI.
64. See Private Litigation Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 302 (1993) (statement of A.A. Sommer, Jr.).
65. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, S. REP. No. 98, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1995).
66. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-J (West Supp. 1996) (adding new § J0A(b)(3) to the
Exchange Act). Similar legislation attempting to impose new duties and responsibilities
upon auditors had been introduced in Congress on numerous occasions since the mid1980s by then-Rep. (now Sen.) Ron Wyden (D-OR). See, e.g., The Financial Fraud
Detection and Disclosure Act, H.R. 4313, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); The Financial
Institutions Safety and Consumer Choice Act of 1991, H.R. 6, 102d Cong., I st Sess.
(1991); The Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act, H.R. 5439, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. ( I 986).
67. New § I 0A(a) requires that each audit of a public company by an independent
public accountant shall include:
(I) procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance of detecting illegal
acts that would have a direct and material effect on the determination of
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relationship between public companies and their auditors by requiring
auditors to take specific steps, if they learn during the course of an audit
that a client may have committed an "illegal act," a term defined broadly
to include "an act or omission that violates any law, or any rule or
regulation having the force of law."68 In such circumstances, and
regardless of the perceived impact of the illegal act on the clients
financial statements, the auditor must (1) determine whether it is likely
that an illegal act has occurred, (2) if so, determine the possible effect
on the client's financial statements, including "any contingent monetary
effects, such as fines, penalties, and damages", and (3) as soon as
practicable, inform management of the illegal acts and assure that the
client's audit committee is also adequately informed with respect to such
acts, unless the illegal act is "clearly inconsequential."69
Moreover, the Reform Act imposes reporting obligations not currently
required or contemplated under GAAS, if management fails to respond
"appropriate[ly]" upon learning of significant illegal activities. Auditors
must report to the board of directors if they believe that ( 1) an illegal act
will have a material effect on an issuer's financial statements, (2) senior
management has not taken "timely and appropriate remedial actions"
with respect to the illegal act, and (3) failure to take remedial action will
result in the issuance of a non-standard audit report or the auditor's

financial statement amounts;
(2) procedures designed to identify related-party transactions that are
material to the financial statements or otherwise require disclosure therein; and
(3) an evaluation of whether there is substantial doubt about the ability of
the issuer to continue as a going concern during the ensuing fiscal year.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West Supp. 1996) (adding new§ IOA(a)(l)-(3) to the Exchange
Act).
Auditors of public companies are already required to perform such procedures under
generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS). See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards, AU §§ 316 (The
Auditors Responsibility to Detect and Report Errors and Parties), 317 (Illegal Acts by
Clients), 334 (Related Parties), and 341 (The Auditor's Consideration of an Entity's
Ability to Continue as a Going Concern) (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1991).
Section 1OA, however, provides that these procedures "may be modified or supplemented
from time to time by the Commission." 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West Supp. 1996) (adding
new§ IOA(f) to the Exchange Act)(emphasis added).
68. Id. § 78j-1 (adding new§ IOA(a) to the Exchange Act)(emphasis added).
69. Id. (adding new§ IOA(b)(l) to the Exchange Act). New section IOA directs
auditors to discharge these responsibilities in accordance with GAAS, but again states
that these standards may be "modified or supplemented from time to time by the
Commission." Id. (emphasis added).
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resignation from the audit engagement. 70 Once auditors report to the
board that appropriate remedial actions have not been taken, an issuer
must inform the SEC of the auditor's conclusions within one business
day of receiving the accountants' report. If the issuer fails to do so, the
reporting duty passes to the auditor, who must notify the SEC the
following day. To encourage and enforce these reporting obligations,
section IOA(c) precludes private auditor liability based on any finding,
conclusion, or statement expressed in a report to a company's board or
the SEC, 71 while section lOA(d) authorizes the SEC to impose civil
penalties in cease-and-desist proceedings against auditors who "willfully"72 violate these reporting obligations. 73 The significance of this
aspect of legislation cannot be ignored.

B.

Implications for Auditor-Client Relationships

Since these new accounting requirements will first apply to audits
undertaken in early 1997 ,74 companies and their auditors have an
opportunity to review section JOA and plan ahead. There are certain

70. Id. (adding new§ I0A(b)(2) to the Exchange Act).
71. The legislative history of an earlier version of the Reform Act states that this
provision is intended to ensure that accountants are not exposed to private litigation
"based on the content of their direct reports to the Commission." See Financial Fraud
Detection and Disclosure Act, H.R. REP. No. 890, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1992).
Although the legislative history to the 1992 version of the Wyden bill states that this
provision "is not intended to circumscribe in any way the existing rights of private
individuals to sue accountants with respect to other matters, including with respect to any
failure by the auditor to file such reports or any failure by the auditor to comply with
GAAS," id. at 25, the statutory language is sufficiently broad to allow auditors to
maintain that they are not liable in any private action in which the allegations pertain to
matters disclosed or discussed in the auditor's report.
72. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-I (West Supp. 1996) (adding new§ I0A(d) to the Exchange
Act). The SEC has construed the term "willful" under the Exchange Act to mean
voluntary conduct, not knowledge that the voluntary conduct constitutes a violation of
the law. See, e.g., In re The Whitehall Corp., 38 S.E.C. 259 (I 958). Recent cases cast
doubt on the validity of the Commission's interpretation, however, and instead suggest
the need to apply a criminal intent standard. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S.
192, 20 I ( 1991) (holding, in a criminal prosecution for failure to file a tax return, that
"the standard for the statutory willfulness requirement is the 'voluntary, intentional
violation of a known legal duty."').
73. The amount of the civil penalty in any such proceeding would be governed by
the standards set forth in §2IB of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(b)(2) (1994).
Under § 2 IB(b )(2) the maximum penalty for each violation that involves deliberate or
reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement is $50,000 for a natural person or
$250,000 for any other person.
74. The Reform Act's requirements apply to each annual report for any period
beginning on or after January I, 1996 with respect to any registrant required to file
quarterly financial data with the SEC, and for any period beginning on or after January
l, 1997 with respect to any other registrant. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-l (West Supp. 1996)
(adding new§ I0A(b) to the Exchange Act).

860

[VOL. 33: 845, 1996]

Promises Made, Promises Kept
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

steps public companies and their auditors could consider to satisfy the
Reform Act's new requirements.

1.

Management Should Review, Enhance, and Regularize Its
Lines of Communication With Company Auditors

Public companies already need continuous and appropriate interaction
with outside auditors, including periodic meetings, communications in
connection with ongoing litigation or other significant accounting-related
issues, discussions preparatory to the annual audit, and a thorough
review of the annual audit. The Reform Act increases exponentially the
need for effective lines of communication; no company would want to
be the subject of a section IOA report, which could leave a company
vulnerable to significant stock price fluctuations, serious adverse
publicity, and potentially ruinous attention from various governmental
quarters. Companies and their auditors should make every effort to
ensure that concerns are raised with the audit committee, and that
appropriate remedial steps are being taken before such concerns are
reported to the SEC. 75
Beyond these efforts, there are a number of additional steps that public
company managements may want to consider.
(a) Senior management should develop a regimen of working closely
with auditors to learn of, investigate, and respond to, any auditor
concerns about, or suspicions of, illegal conduct. In essence, management must be proactive in dealing with the outside auditors. By the time
issues are brought to management's attention by the auditors, it already
may be too late to effect a meaningful response and obviate any need for
a section 1OA report.

75. Currently, a Form 8-K disclosing a change in a company's auditors generally
results in a review by the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance. See Amendments to
Regulation S-K Regarding Changes in Accountants, Financial Reporting Release No. 34,
7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,r 72,434, at 62,128 n.5 (Mar. 8, 1989) (noting that all Forms
8-K disclosing a change in auditors are reviewed by the Division of Corporation Finance
and that "[t]his review may result in a referral to the Commission's Division of
Enforcement, examination of the [registrant's] current or next financial statements on a
high priority basis, or disposition according to the routine comment process") (emphasis
added). A section I OA report disclosing an auditor's conclusion that management has
failed to take appropriate remedial actions after being apprised of illegal acts, however,
almost certainly will trigger an immediate inquiry by the Enforcement Division.
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(b) At least one member of senior management should be designated
as the contact person to whom auditors may immediately report any
suspected illegal acts. Centralizing the function of interaction with the
outside auditors in one or two senior managers is likely to ensure that
any and all reports of possible illegal acts are actually communicated
from the auditors to management, and then appropriately evaluated by
management. Obvious candidates for these roles are the Chief Financial
Officer and the Chief Legal Officer.
(c) Any and all indications of possible illegal conduct should be dealt
with carefully and effectively, whether brought to management's
attention by the outside auditors or otherwise. It probably does not bear
too much emphasis to note that indications of illegality from any source
should be treated with equal dignity. Nothing could be worse than an
indication that problems identified by the auditor had been raised
previously, but that management had been inattentive to those concerns.
To the extent management can document its responsiveness to indications of potential illegality, this record will go a long way toward
meeting the statutory judgment thrust upon auditors to be satisfied that
management responds appropriately to indications of illegal acts.
Particularly with respect to information brought to management's
attention by outside auditors, indications of auditor concern should be
logged, and a discussion should ensue with corporate counsel, to
ascertain whether any action by the management team may be necessary
in light of the information reported by the auditors.
(d) Management's determinations on how to respond (or a determination not to respond) to indications of illegal acts should be passed by the
auditors, and the auditors' acquiescence in that resolution should be
recorded in some permanent form. To the extent decisions are made
either to take action, or not to take action, these should be documented
in writing. Particularly where possible illegal acts have been identified
by the auditors, management should be able to demonstrate at a later
point in time that it alerted the auditors to the precise response
management contemplated, and the auditors expressed no discomfort
with that approach. Where management rejects suggestions by the
auditors, the reasons for the rejection should be recorded, supported, and
made known to the auditors. A close working relationship between
management and a company's auditors is critical to allay any concerns
on the part of the auditors that management is prepared to, and will,
respond appropriately and promptly to any concerns that may be brought
to management's attention.
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2.

Audit Committees Should Review and Revise Their
Charters and Procedures to Ensure Their
Ability to Respond Effectively to Significant
Issues Brought to Their Attention by
Management or the Company s Outside Auditors

As noted, the Reform Act imposes a heavy burden on audit committees to ensure that senior management has taken "timely and appropriate
remedial actions" upon being advised of illegal acts that could have a
material effect on an issuer's financial statements. 76 Audit committees
thus should consider a number of steps to make their involvement in the
process as effective as possible.
(a) Audit committees should review their charters to ensure their
ability to learn of, investigte and redress suspected illegal acts. Most
audit committees have formal, written charters defining their responsibilities. 77 In light of the obligations placed on them under the Reform Act,
audit committees should review their charters to ensure that appropriate
mechanisms exist for the reporting of illegal acts to the committee by
both management and the outside auditors. In order to ensure that
appropriate remedial steps are taken when illegal acts are detected, the
charter also should empower the committee to conduct investigations and
to retain outside counsel and other experts, if necessary, to assist in such
investigations. 78 Naturally, where improper conduct is believed to have
occurred, the audit committee will need ample authority to redress any
violations of law.
(b) Audit committees should establish an ongoing dialogue with their
outside auditors, without the presence of management, and at the

76. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West Supp. 1996) (adding new § 1OA(b)(2)(B) to the
Exchange Act).
77. The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (the "Treadway
Commission") recommended in 1987 that all public corporations develop a written
charter setting forth the duties and responsibilities of the audit committee. See JAMES
C. TREADWAY, JR., ET. AL., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT
FINANCIAL REPORTING 42 (I 987). The Treadway Commission further advised that the
audit committee charter should be reviewed periodically and amended as necessary. Id.
78. A company's full board of directors may also wish to consider whether to
authorize the audit committee to compel senior management to take remedial measures,
at least when it appears that management has failed to respond on a timely basis to
concerns raised by the auditors.
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initiative of both the committee and the auditors. An important
byproduct of the Reform Act is to require audit committees to become
more involved in the audit process itself. Among other things, the
committee should make clear to the outside auditors that they are
available for consultation with respect to any concerns that arise during
an audit (or at other times), especially when illegal acts are suspected to
have occurred. Even in the absence of a request for such consultations,
the audit committee should initiate periodic meetings with the auditors
to satisfy itself that the auditors are not aware of any conduct that raises
questions under the Reform Act.
(c) Audit committees should insist upon an ongoing, periodic dialogue
with senior management to ascertain whether there have been indications
of potential illegal acts, and to satisfy themselves as to the efficacy of
management's responses to such indications. Because of the dramatic
consequences that can arise under the Reform Act in response to
indications of potential illegal conduct, the audit committee (or any other
committee of the board of directors that the board seeks to vest with this
responsibility) should undertake a regular and periodic review of what
problems have arisen and how management has dealt with those
problems. Among other things, breaches of corporate codes of conduct,
and the punishments meted out to redress those breaches, are matters the
audit committee should review on a regular basis.
3. Companies Should Review Their Codes of
Conduct to Enhance Their Ability to Satisfy
Their Obligations Under the Reform Act
Most public companies have adopted a written code of conduct. 79
Codes of conduct should indicate that violations by employees will result
in significant penalties. By establishing a possible range of penalties,
and reviewing the code of conduct with the auditors in advance,
companies may find it easier, should a problem later arise, to satisfy
their accountants that they have taken "appropriate remedial actions."80

79. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and
Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559,
1601-02 ( 1990) (concluding, based on survey results, that "corporate codes have become
standard corporate fare.").
80. While current auditing standards imply that auditors should consider whether
management has taken appropriate remedial measures upon learning that illegal acts may
have occurred, they provide limited guidance as to what types of measures are
appropriate in different circumstances. See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS,
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 54, § 17 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants
1996) [hereinafter Auditing Standards] (noting that possible remedial actions include
"disciplinary action against involved personnel, seeking restitution, adoption of
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Codes of conduct should be reviewed periodically to ensure they reflect
both case law developments and the latest experiences of the company
in dealing with untoward conduct. Efforts also should be made to
monitor the sanctions imposed under the code of conduct, in order to
confirm that the sanctions provide an effective deterrent and are
consistently applied.
4. Companies Should Provide Employees With an Anonymous
Internal Mechanism to Disclose Potential Illegal or Questionable
Conduct Without Fear of Recrimination or Retribution

The best source for indications of potentially wrongful conduct
generally is the corporation itself. Employees tend to become aware
when those above them, below them, or simply around them are
breaking corporate policies or engaging in illegal conduct. Some
companies shy away from providing a mechanism for employees to
report illegal acts within the company. The reasons for this reluctance
typically include concerns about privilege, the fear that employees will
be encouraged to dredge up instances of potential wrongdoing they
might otherwise be inclined to ignore, and the imposition on the
company of the obligation to respond to each and every indication of
potential illegality. While it cannot be gainsaid that such disadvantages,
and perhaps others, 81 may flow from creating an anonymous reporting
mechanism, the benefits seem to us to far outweigh the negatives, and
the passage of the Reform Act seems to make this the most prudent
course for companies to follow.
In the absence of an internal reporting mechanism, employees will
have no confidence that they can bring their concerns about the conduct
of others (and especially superiors) to anyone's attention. Experience
teaches that when employees have no internal mechanism to report their
concerns, these concerns will be reported outside the corporation when

preventive or corrective company policies, and modifications of specific control
procedures.").
81. If a mechanism exists for employees to report improper or questionable
conduct on an anonymous basis, auditors may ask to review the records pertaining to this
mechanism as part of their fulfillment of the duties imposed on them by the Reform Act.
In addition, the existence of such a mechanism may attract attention from the
government, private litigants, and other persons with axes to grind against a company's
interests.
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they cause discomfort. It is difficult to imagine any benign recipient of
this type of information who may reside outside a corporation. Likely
candidates include reporters, the government, corporate competitors,
short sellers, and lawyers who specialize in defending so-called "whistle
blowers." Try as we might, we cannot come up with any positive
benefits associated with restricting the ability of employees to divulge
questionable corporate conduct solely to these categories of recipients!
Of course, if an internal mechanism is established, a company must
ensure that there is appropriate follow-up to redress the issues reported.
Again, it is important for the company not only to respond properly to
such concerns, but also to be able to refer to a contemporaneous record
of the actions taken by the company when potentially illegal or
questionable conduct is brought to its attention.

5.

In Advance of an Annual Audit, Auditors and Audit
Committees Should Consider and Agree Upon
Appropriate Methodologies and Definitions for the
Application of the Reform Act

While the Reform Act is quite significant, it is not self-contained.
Questions will arise concerning its interpretation and application. For a
variety of reasons, and in the absence of any SEC rulemaking to
implement the Reform Act, we believe that it is better to try to establish
ground rules for some of the interpretive issues that are sure to arise,
before those issues actually surface, when their resolution is not tainted
by concerns about the specific conduct involved. Several possibilities
for consideration exist.
(a) Audit committees and auditors should decide which issues are
"clearly inconsequential." The Reform Act provides that an auditor
need not communicate "clearly inconsequential" illegal acts to the audit
committee,82 but no definition of this critical term is supplied. Since
no obvious consensus may exist as to what acts fall within this category,
audit committees should establish a clear understanding with the auditors
as to the types of acts that will not be brought to the audit committee's
attention, in order to avoid later recriminations.
(b) Audit committees and auditors should attempt to reach agreement
regarding the audit procedures to be employed to assist the auditors in
fulfilling their obligation to seek indications of illegal conduct. While
the conduct of an audit, in the final analysis, must be left to the auditors,
public companies and their auditors both will benefit from a discussion
82. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-l (West Supp. 1996) (adding new§ IOA(b)(l)(B) to the
Exchange Act).
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of any special audit procedures the auditors intend to employ to satisfy
the Reform Act's requirements. In particular, companies that have
internal reporting mechanisms or maintain adequate records of customer
and employee complaints may find that their outside auditors seek access
to these materials. Similarly, auditors may seek access to inside and
outside counsel to assess just how significant indications of illegality
actually are, and whether they have been dealt with effectively. A
company's failure to provide access to these materials and sources may
compel an auditor to deem itself incapable of concluding that management has handled indications of illegality appropriately and expeditiously. On the other hand, affording access to some of these materials or
sources may constitute a waiver of the attorney-client and attorney work
product protections. While there are no easy answers to these dilemmas,
the best solution is for the audit committee and the auditors to discuss
these problems candidly before an audit commences, not when a
problem arises.

6.

Auditors Should Rethink Their Engagement Letters in
Light of the Reform Act and Determine Whether They
Have the Resources and Support of the Company Needed to
Satisfy the Reform Acts Obligations
The Reform Act imposes a number of significant obligations on
outside auditors, including duties to structure the audit process in a way
designed to detect illegal acts by clients, to determine whether it is likely
that an illegal act took place, to assess the potential financial consequences of any illegal acts that are uncovered, and to evaluate whether
management has responded appropriately to any such acts. 83 Given
these requirements, auditors may wish to ensure that their retainer letters
adequately take into account the various issues implicated by the Reform
Act. In particular, the subjects that could be addressed include the
following.

83. Traditionally, the audit literature has disclaimed the ability of accountants to
make such legal determinations. See Auditing Standards, supra note 80, at §§ 3 (stating
that "[w]hether an act is, in fact, illegal is a determination that is normally beyond the
auditor's professional competence.") and 7 (providing that an audit conducted in
accordance with GAAS "provides no assurance that illegal acts will be detected or that
any contingent liabilities that may result will be disclosed.").
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(a) A delineation of any audit procedures specifically designed to
assist the outside auditors in detecting whether client fraud has occurred.
From a practical perspective, auditors should consider whether additional
procedures are required, or whether procedures previously employed will
suffice in the performance of their new statutory obligations. Whichever
determination is made, it may be useful to indicate whether (and if so,
what) additional procedures will be employed, and to obtain
management's concurrence with the decisions made, as well as
management's assurance that it is not aware of any specific circumstances that might warrant additional audit procedures, or any specific audit
procedures that might be warranted in light of circumstances known to
management.
(b) A contractual undertaking from management and the audit
committee to provide whatever assistance and information may be
appropriate to enable the auditors to fulfill their statutory obligations.
This is an area where specificity may benefit companies and their
management, and generalization may benefit the auditors. To the extent
that management has prepared reports regarding illegal acts or sanctioned
individuals for illegal acts, however, the auditors presumably will want
to have some information about the types of illegal or improper acts that
have been found by management or the audit committee during the
preceding fiscal year. Customer complaints, governmental inquiries,
anonymous reports, litigations instituted and threatened, and any internal
analyses of industry-specific problems (whether or not they have
materialized at the particular client company) are all subjects into which
auditors may deem it appropriate to delve. At the present time,
management is not required to identify all government inquiries,
customer complaints or anonymous reports. Nor is it clear that auditors
will be required to ascertain all of these items in order to satisfy their
obligations under the Reform Act. But it will behoove both the auditors
and management to consider whether any of this information is
appropriate to provide to the auditors and, if so, in what format.
(c) Depending upon the circumstances, authority for the outside
auditors to retain their own counsel and/or obtain access to inside
corporate counsel.
In order to satisfy their statutory obligations, auditors may not only
require outside counsel of their own, but also may seek access to
damage calculations and liability assessments prepared by company
lawyers. Any such request, of course, would raise significant issues as
to the waiver of the corporate attorney-client privilege or attorney work
product protections. Auditors and their clients should also determine
which party will bear these expenses and may wish to document their
decision in retainer or engagement letters.
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(d) An agreed-upon resolution of how auditors should handle illegal
acts detected outside an audit engagement. As noted, section l0A's
reporting requirements are triggered only when an auditor becomes
aware, "in the course of conducting an audit," that illegal acts may have
occurred. 84 Accountants may learn of possible illegal acts, however, in
contexts outside the annual audit (for example, when performing a
quarterly review of a company's financial statements, or while providing
consulting or other non-attest services). The SEC may take the position
that an auditor's obligations upon learning of potential illegal acts
outside an annual audit are similar to those that exist under new section
IOA when such acts come to the auditor's attention during an audit
engagement. In assessing their obligations outside the scope of an
annual audit, however, auditors will be required to balance the SEC's
likely position with the fact that, depending upon the circumstances, the
safe harbor protections afforded under section l0A(c) may be unavailable if the auditor's report was not the result of information learned
during an annual audit. 85 Public companies and their auditors should
discuss whether such information will be handled in the same manner as
suspicious facts learned during the annual audit, and may wish to note
their understandings in the retainer letter.
(e) An express undertaking by management to advise the auditors
when the SEC is notified of a section IOA report. Once the auditors
issue a section IOA report, the company to whom that report is issued
is obligated to notify the SEC of its receipt. In the event the company
does not fulfill its obligation to report to the SEC, that duty falls upon
the outside auditor. In order to justify the auditor's filing with the SEC,
retainer agreements should make clear that the company has an
obligation to notify the auditor immediately upon the filing of a section
JOA report with the SEC, and that the failure to receive such notification
within the next business day will constitute implicit authorization for the
auditors to notify the Commission directly on their own.

84. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-l (West Supp. 1996) (adding new § IOA(b)(J) to the
Exchange Act).
85. At least with respect to information learned during a review of quarterly
financial information, auditors can argue that the safe harbor provisions limiting their
liability should apply. See MARTIN A. MILLER & LARRY P. BAILEY, MILLER'S
COMPREHENSlVE GAAS GUIDE § 13.13 (noting that "[i]n most instances, the review of
interim financial information likely would be an extension of the audit engagement.").
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C.

Implications for the Relationship Between the SEC and the
Accounting Profession

The Reform Act also will have several effects upon the relationship
between the SEC and the accounting profession.

1.

The SEC May Play a More Active Role in Defining GAAS, or
Assume a More Active Role in Interpreting an Auditors
Fulfillment of the Responsibility to Investigate Illegal Acts

Section lOA requires auditors to perform designated audit procedures
and assess the consequences of suspected illegal acts "in accordance with
generally accepted auditing standards, as may be modified or supplemented from time to time by the [SECJ." 86 The legislative history
makes clear that Congress intended that "the SEC . . . continue its
longstanding practice of looking to the private sector to set and to
improve auditing standards." 87 Nevertheless, section lOA's clear
authorization to the SEC to establish GAAS may render the Commission
unable, or unwilling, to resist the temptation to issue new audit
requirements. 88 Even if the SEC does not expressly exercise its
authority under section lOA to define GAAS, the Reform Act provides
the SEC with a new vehicle to articulate its interpretations of existing
GAAS. In the past, the Commission has only rarely disciplined
accountants based on their alleged failure under GAAS to detect and
report illegal acts by clients. 89 In the future, however, the SEC may
assert that noncompliance with such standards violates not only
professional requirements, but also section 1OA.

86. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-l (West Supp. 1996) (adding new§ I0A(a) to the Exchange
Act) (emphasis added).
87. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 47-48. Indeed, since the Refonn
Act's enactment, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has proposed
revisions to its current standards governing illegal acts by clients designed to enhance
an auditor's responsibilities to detect such activities. See Lee Berton, Auditors Face
Stiffer Rules for Finding, Reporting Fraud at Client Companies, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5,
1996, at A2.
88. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 48 (noting that "[t]he SEC should
act promptly [to modify or supplement GAAS] if required by the public interest or for
the protection of investors.").
89. See, e.g., In re Scott L. Jenson, C.P.A., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Release. No. 534, 56 SEC Docket 0474 (Mar. 22, 1994). In this Rule 2(e) proceeding,
the SEC alleged that an auditor failed to comply with SAS No. 54 because he failed to
detennine whether a client's weaknesses in internal controls rose to such a level as to
violate the accounting and internal controls provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act. The Commission stressed that Jenson neither consulted with counsel nor reported
his concerns directly to the issuer's board of directors.
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2.

New Section JOA Requires Auditors to Make
Managerial Judgments on Behalf of Their
Clients and, as a Result, Should Require the
SEC to Modify Some of Its Longstanding
Positions on Auditor Independence

The SEC often takes the position that an auditor cannot be independent with respect to a client if the auditor assumes functions similar to
those customarily performed by management. 90 New section lOA,
however, not only allows, but requires an auditor to determine whether
a company has taken "timely and appropriate remedial actions" when
illegal acts come to light. 91 The Reform Act thus imposes quasimanagerial responsibilities on auditors to assess the adequacy of a
company's response, and implicitly recognizes that auditors can play an
important role in developing and implementing remedial measures.
Accordingly, section JOA should cause the Commission to revisit some
of its historical biases against the rendering of certain non-attest services
by accounting firms for their clients.
Audits determine whether a company's financial statements are
presented fairly, in accordance with GAAP, not whether fraud per se
occurred. This was true before the Reform Act, and it remains true
today. The Reform Act, however, embraces and strengthens the need for
auditors to employ specific procedures designed to uncover illegal acts
that could have a material impact on client financial statements. Over
time, the interplay between GAAS and new section JOA will be
clarified. In the interim, companies and auditors should coordinate their
efforts closely to ensure that illegal acts are promptly brought to the
attention of management and the audit committee, and that appropriate
remedial measures are identified and implemented.

90. See, e.g., CODIFICATION OF FINANCIAL REPORTING POLICIES, § 602.02.d, 17
C.F.R. pt. 210 (Feb. 25, 1983).
91. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j-1 (West Supp. 1996) (adding new § 10A(b)(2)(B) to the
Exchange Act).
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V.

THE CORPORATE BOARD

A.

Introduction

Litigation risk is an occupational hazard of service as a director on a
corporate board. This is true in securities litigation even though
"independent" corporate directors typically are not enmeshed in the
mechanics of preparing the company's disclosure. The introduction of
the Reform Act makes this an apt time for a corporate board to reassess
the company's disclosure practices and the operation of its compliance
program. This assessment does not occur in a vacuum. The Reform Act
has become law at a time when directors are under increased scrutiny for
their response to allegations of management misconduct. These
pressures serve as an important backdrop to a discussion of how
corporate boards should respond to the Reform Act.

B.

Director Accountability

The Reform Act's passage will not alter the fact that civil litigation is
a constant risk for corporate directors. A recent survey of 300 directors
of Fortune 500 companies found that nearly half had been sued in their
capacity as outside directors. 92 The risk of litigation, however, is not
the sole means of heightening directors' accountability. Regulators have
taken additional steps to remind directors of their obligations. Thus,
although independent directors rarely prepare disclosure statements, the
SEC repeatedly has reinforced their shared responsibility for the final
product. 93 And, in the SEC's first use of its enforcement powers to

92. See Brian Cox, Small-Firm Directors Have Biggest D & 0 Concern, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER PROP. & CASUALTY-RISK BENEFITS, Oct. 2, 1995, at 34 (discussing a
Louis Harris & Associates Poll, Outside Directors and the Risks They Face).
Directors long have been acutely aware of the significant risks posed by private
securities litigation to corporate boards and the companies they serve. Indeed, a recent
survey found an increase in claims asserted against corporate directors involved
allegations of improper disclosure under the federal securities Jaws. See Edward
Felsenthal & Junda Yoo, As Suits Against Officers Level Off, Disclosure Cases Rise,
WALL ST. J., Feb 17, 1993, at BIO (Wyatt Co. survey of 1342 companies found that
I 0% of claims in the previous nine years against directors and officers involved financial
disclosure, an increase from 6% in the nine-year period ending 1990).
93. When the disclosure requirements for executive compensation were overhauled
in 1992, the Commission's rules were framed to require that the report of the board's
compensation committee appear under the names of the individual directors on the
committee. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(k)(3)(l995). This requirement was crafted with
deliberation; the proposal to require a report by the Board Compensation Committee
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reinforce its longstanding efforts to foster more meaningful disclosure in
the Management Discussion and Analysis section of public filings, the
Commission's Caterpillar release noted that public companies have an
obligation to make disclosure of material or highly significant information that has been underscored for the board. 94
In this retributive decade of the l 990s,95 when corporations can find
longstanding senior managers suddenly suspected of egregious criminal
wrongdoing by a very aggressive governmental cadre of prosecutors, the
Commission has stressed that inaction can be a director's cardinal sin.
In its December 1994 Cooper Companies release,96 the Commission
took the opportunity to send a message to other corporate boards in the
form of a report under section 2l(a) of the Exchange Act. The
Commission emphasized that "directors have a significant responsibility
and play a critical role in safeguarding the integrity of the company's
public statements and the interests of investors when evidence of
fraudulent conduct by corporate management comes to their attention. "97 The Commission's release noted that Cooper co-chairman Gary
Singer and his brother, Steven Singer (Cooper's chief administrative
officer), responded to government inquiries by invoking their Fifth
Amendment privilege and declined to be interviewed by Cooper's
counsel. 98 Nonetheless, their latitude in managing the company was
not restricted by the Cooper board in any meaningful way. This, the
Commission alleged, allowed Steven Singer to issue a press release in
May 1992 indicating that Cooper was "unaware of any wrongdoing on

"provoked the strongest comment of any of the proposals concerning executive
compensation." Executive Compensation Disclosure Rule Amendments, Securities Act
Release No. 6962, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ,I 85,056, at 83,414,
83,431 (Oct. 16, 1992). See also Harvey L. Pitt et. al., Proxy Reform: A New Era of
SEC Activism, INSIGHTS, Nov. 1992.
94. In re Caterpillar, Inc., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 30532, 51
SEC Docket 0197 (Apr. 14, 1992). For a detailed analysis of that release, see Harvey
L. Pitt et al., The SEC's New Preference for Prophecy, LEGAL TIMES, July 6, 1992, at
28.
95. See, e.g., Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Mischief Afoot: The Need
for Incentives to Control Corporate Criminal Conduct, 71 B.U. L. REV. 447, 448-49
(1991),
96. See In re Cooper Companies, Inc., [1994-95 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ,I 85,472, at 86,061 (Dec. 12, 1994),
97. Id. at 86,062.
98. Id. at 86,063.
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the part of its officers or its employees."99 The Commission found that
statement misleading; by May 1992, the Company was aware that Gary
Singer had engaged in a series of transactions between Cooper and
Singer family accounts, which were concealed from the company and
were under investigation, during which they had asserted their rights
under the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination. 100
The SEC found that the Cooper board did too little, too late, in the
face of this situation. "By failing to take immediate and decisive
corrective action on these matters, the Cooper Board appeared to prefer
management's interest in keeping the facts secret over the investors'
interest in full, fair and accurate disclosure under the federal securities
laws." 101 Specifically, the Commission emphasized that the board
made half-hearted efforts to restrict Singer's activities once he was
designated the target of a criminal inquiry. Throughout the months of
the investigation, Singer maintained discretion over Cooper's substantial
portfolio of securities. 102 Even after being placed on administrative
leave, Singer appeared at Cooper's headquarters several times each
week, met with officers regarding company business, and was able to
place calls to brokers handling Cooper's securities accounts. 103 The
Commission stressed that the fiduciary obligations of the Cooper board
were "particularly acute where potential violations of the federal
securities laws involving self-dealing and fraud by management are
called to the attention of the board of directors." 104
The SEC's Enforcement Division is not the sole prod being felt by
corporate boards. Last fall, Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. (ADM) was
pelted with letters from public institutional investors lambasting the
directors for their perceived inadequate response to federal inquiries
about internal misconduct at the company involving alleged price
collusion and off-the-books compensation for several executives. The
California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), for
example, complained the ADM board was dominated by insiders. 105
Responding to such criticisms, ADM announced early this year that the
99. Id. at 86,064.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 86,065.
I 02. Id. at 86,064 n.10.
I 03. Id. at 86,065.
I 04. Id. at 86,065.
105. Joann S. Lublin, Archer-Daniels-Midland Is Drawing Fire From Some
Institutional Holders, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 1995, at B12. Similarly, New York City
comptroller Alan G. Hevesi sent ADM Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Wayne
Andreas a letter requesting that Mr. Andreas describe what board actions were being
taken to ensure the board's independence and to safeguard against unethical and illegal
conduct. Id.
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board unanimously had approved a series of recommendations made by
a corporate governance committee to place outside directors in majority
control of the board. 106 The committee, formed in the wake of the
negative publicity, recommended that the board's size be reduced from
seventeen members to between nine and fifteen members, with most of
those members constituting outside directors. The reforms served to
mute some------but not all----of the criticism directed at ADM's board. 107
AD M's experience is not atypical of companies confronting allegations
of misconduct by their personnei. 108 Indeed, the reform of the SEC's
proxy rules has enhanced the capacity of institutional investors to
amplify the influence afforded by their substantial equity positions. 109
New information technologies are accelerating the rate at which such
liaisons among institutional investors can occur. For example, one
shareholder-rights group has tapped into the Internet by staking out a site
on the World Wide Web to distribute research on corporate governance,
among other activities, and to facilitate "director lobbying" by forwarding messages to corporate directors from the public. " 0 In this environment, once a company faces serious legal questions, both management
and the board will be required to respond quickly.

106. See Kurt Eichenwald, Big Board Room Shift Will Bring in Outsiders, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 1996, at D 1; Archer Daniels Midland Shuffles Board, WASH. POST, Jan.
16, 1996, at D3.
107. While Cal PERS General Counsel Richard Koppes reportedly called the
committee's report "a quantum leap forward," the United Brotherhood of Carpenters
noted that ADM's board was "catching up .... These guys [at ADM] have gone from
the Dark Ages to the Middle Ages." The union has indicated it intends to bring
proposals before the shareholders at the next annual meeting suggesting that all board
committees be composed of independent directors and that directors be held personally
liable in instances of gross negligence. Scott Kilman & Joann S. Lublin, ADM Panel
Recommends Sweeping Changes in Board, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 1996, at A3; Scott
Kilman, ADM Directors Raise Issue of Andreas Successor, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 1996,
at A5. See also Eichenwald, supra note 106, at DI.
108. For example, the Teamsters union urged the Gannett Co. board to retain an
independent auditor to investigate the company's response to insider trading charges
against a Gannett executive when the executive continued to manage one of the
company's largest investments. Mark Fitzgerald, Teamsters Continue to Pressure
Gannett Board, EDITOR & PUBLISHER MAG., Sept. 30, 1995, at 10.
109. See Karl A. Groskaufinanis, Proxy Reform and the Brave New World of
Investor Relations: Ten Rules of Thumb for the 1990s, INSIGHTS, Dec. 1993, at 18.
110. Geoffrey Smith, Raider on the Net, Bus. WK., Oct. 23, 1995, at 35.
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C.

Considerations for the Board

Given these pressures, corporate directors have a vested interest in a
company's disclosure practices. In light of these rules, there are four
questions that directors should ask of the company's senior managers.

1.

Does the Company Have a Disclosure Regimen,
and If So, What Is It?

Before considering alterations to existing practices, it is prudent to
assess how the present system operates in practice (and where modifications should be made). While public companies are subject to standardized reporting requirements, their approaches to these disclosure
requirements vary widely. Nonetheless, several elements should be
common to all disclosure regimens.
(a) Every company needs a disclosure regimen that is tailored to the
particular activities and culture of the company. This is important for
two reasons. First, in crafting disclosures for periodic filings, there must
be a mechanism in place that ensures that any significant information
will be considered and reviewed for possible inclusion in a public filing.
Second, the board is under much more of an affirmative obligation to
know precisely what, of a material nature, is going on within the
company. This is the byproduct of the accounting reforms in the
Reform Act, but it is also a byproduct of various governmental
pronouncements seeking to impose heavier obligations upon outside
directors.
(b) Every public company should designate one or two spokespersons
who are authorized to make comments to the marketplace or respond to
inquiries.
The disclosure regimen will operate most effectively when the company
can impose some real controls on what is being said and by whom.
Consistency is critical in this regard, and limiting the number of
corporate spokespersons is helpful in ensuring that whatever comments
are made can be addressed quickly. Prompt debriefings of corporate
spokespersons after they have communicated with institutional investors,
analysts or reporters, is an essential facet of any disclosure regimen.
(c) There should be some methodology to review the narrative of
public filings both before and after they are disseminated to the public.
While the managers actively involved in running the business need not
be involved in preparing historical data, they should review the
Management, Discussion and Analysis section of public filings to ensure
that it is an accurate reflection of the business. In addition, there should
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be some mechanism for senior managers to check with department and
division heads to find out what items of significance are percolating
through the company, whether or not these matters have yet reached a
critical stage or have yet been reported to the board.
(d) Corporate directors should seek face-to-face meetings with senior
management around the time of public filings to ensure that information
of a material or significant nature has been brought to the board's
attention and is properly disclosed. In connection with certain disclosure
obligations, such as the filing of an annual report on SEC Form 10-K,
directors (or at least a majority of them) are required to certify they have
reviewed the disclosures and believe them to be accurate. At periodic
filing time (as well as the filing of current statements on SEC Form 8K), it makes sense for management and the directors to sit down and
discuss the key items of disclosure, understand the matters that were
considered for disclosure but rejected, and make certain that no loose
ends have been left untied.
(e) Companies should maintain an up-to-date set of disclosure binders
that collect, on a real time basis, all public filings, press releases, analyst
reports, and press accounts. This compilation allows the company to
assess the impression of the issuer that is being formed in the marketplace and how its disclosure practices should be adapted. 111
(t) Companies should review their disclosure regimens periodically
(but not less than annually), to ascertain whether there is any need for
modification in the procedures being employed to craft public disclosures. As with so many things, disclosure reports are an art form that
constantly changes. The boards of public companies would do well to
have senior management analyze for them, on at least an annual basis,
what the current disclosure regimen is, how it has worked, how it differs
from the regimens employed by comparably situated companies, and
whether any new developments in the law, or lore, might affect the
methodology being employed.

For a more detailed discussion of these principles, see Harvey L. Pitt & Karl
NAT'L L.J., Aug. I 0, 1992,
at 24, 26-27.
111.

A. Groskaufmanis, Shareholder Suits Suggest Some Lessons,
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2.

How Are the Company s Competitors Responding to
the Reform Act?

No company should ever adopt by rote the disclosure methodology of
another issuer. Each company must tailor its compliance and disclosure
practices to its unique circumstances. Nevertheless, there is merit in
examining how other, similarly situated companies are responding to the
requirements and opportunities afforded under the legislation. The
response of competitors is important because it will shape expectations
in the marketplace. If, for example, all other companies in an industry
segment adopt a practice of making public statements about expected
future earnings or the impact of certain regulatory initiatives, there will
be considerable pressure upon the company which is not doing so to take
the same approach. This is one factor that both management and the
board can consider in deciding whether to alter existing practices with
respect to disclosure of forward-looking information.
3.

What Are the Company s Relations With Its
Institutional Investors?

In a marketplace increasingly dominated by institutions, 112 public
companies already have a strong incentive to foster good relations with
significant shareholders. The existence of a lead plaintiff requirement
will add to those incentives. Many institutional investors may have little
interest in the time and expense of supervising litigation. If, on the other
hand, institutional investors feel slighted by management and are stung
by a sudden drop in the stock price, they may be more willing to serve
in that capacity. As a practical matter, the same cause of action will
have considerably more credibility with the court and with other
investors when the litigation is led by a substantial investor than would
be the case if the same cause of action was advanced by a nominal
investor with a dozen shares. Given this added risk, corporate directors
should be skeptical of managers who recommend an aloof response to
overtures from institutional shareholders. 113

112. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A HalfTime Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 848 (1994) (citing Columbia Institutional
Investor Project Research indicating that institutional ownership of U.S. equity securities
increased from 23% in 1955 to 53.3% in 1990).
113. See, e.g., Judith H. Dobrynzki, Small Companies, Big Problems, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 6, 1996, at DI (noting the recalcitrance of small and mid-sized companies targeted
for review by CalPERS).
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4. What Steps Should a Company and Its Board Take
When They Learn That Employees Have (or Might)
Become the Subject of a Government Investigation and
Have Asserted (or Might Be Advised to Assert)
Their Fifth Amendment Rights?

By intoning three times the simple words-"! wish to assert my Fifth
Amendment privilege" 114-former Los Angeles Police Department
Detective Mark Fuhrman electrified the trial of O.J. Simpson and
prompted broader soul-searching about the use of the Fifth Amendment.115 The disclosure requirements imposed upon auditors only
compound the difficulties confronted by corporate directors when a
member of senior management is under investigation, or may come
under investigation, and has been (or may be) advised to assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege.
The Cooper Companies release provides just the latest reminder that
an employee's invocation of the Fifth Amendment has implications for
the company as well. The Commission took pains to note that an
officer's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege did not negate the
company's disclosure obligations and, "[i]ndeed, it is under these
circumstances that the need for the Board to safeguard investor interests
may be most compelling." 116 Moreover, the assertion of the Fifth
Amendment privilege over the course of an SEC inquiry will heighten
the suspicions of the Commission's staff and heighten the probability
that an informal investigation will be subject to a formal order of
investigation. 117 In a civil action initiated by the SEC, some courts

114. See David Margolick, Simpson Detective, Back in Court, Refuses to Reply on
Role in Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1995, at Al.
115. See Edward Felsenthal, As Fifth Amendment is Invoked More, Would Framers
Rue What They Have Created?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1995, at Bl.
I 16. In re Cooper Companies, Inc., [1994-95 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ,r 85,472, at 86,064 n.9 (Dec. 12, 1994).
117. See, e.g.. William R. Mc Lucas et. al., SEC Enforcement: A Look at the Current
Program and Some Thoughts About the 1990s, 46 Bus. LAW. 797, 843 (1991)
("Invoking the [F]ifth [A]mendment and resisting requests for documents and other
information may also persuade the staff that the conduct is more likely to merit
investigation. The lack of cooperation, particularly at early stages of an investigation,
may lead to a rapid end to the informal stage of an inquiry.").
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have recognized that the trier of fact can draw an adverse inference from
the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege.us
Directors face a wrenching decision when they learn that an officer
whose integrity they trust is under investigation by the government and
has been advised to assert his or her Fifth Amendment privilege. In that
situation, many directors would take affront at an unyielding rule that the
existence of a government investigation should seal an individual's
career at the company. Yet, at the same time, the existence of the
investigation places the board on notice of at least allegations relating to
what may be serious misconduct. The Reform Act and the Cooper
Companies release reinforce the obligations of boards to assert their
stewardship aggressively at such times. There are several ways in which
boards can balance these concerns.
(a) The board has an obligation to be informed, and informed
promptly, of any governmental inquiry involving corporate employees
of the company and to take steps to satisfy itself regarding the situation.
Merely because a governmental inquiry commences, or proceeds, does
not mean that any wrongdoing occurred or that the employee involved
must forfeit his or her corporate career. But that could be a possible
meaning of such information. The only way for the board to know is
to ensure that it receives an independent assessment of the situation.
The board's responses will be subject to less second-guessing if the
board and its independent advisors have reviewed the relevant facts and
determined whether there is evidence of a violation of law.
(b) Corporate employees should not be allowed to remain in place,
without any restrictions, unless the board is satisfied that the employee
has been forthcoming about the events in question and is not likely to
be found to have violated the law. One of the first questions that must
be addressed when a corporate employee is suspected of wrongful
conduct is whether there are protections in place to prevent a recurrence
of the alleged wrongful conduct. Leaving a corporate officer in place,
without providing such assurances, means that the company, its other
officers, and its directors all expose themselves to potential responsibility
for any further misdeeds that may occur. u9 The Cooper Companies

118. See, e.g., SEC v. Tome, 638 F. Supp. 629, 631-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), ajf'd, 833
F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1014 (1988). But see SEC v. Comserv
Corp., 908 F.2d 1407, 1410, 1410 n.3 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting district court's rejection
of SEC argument that assertion of Fifth Amendment privilege should preclude recovery
of fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act).
119. See In re Gutfreund, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'l! 85,067,
at 83,597, 83,607 (Dec. 3, 1992) ("Had limits been placed on his activities after the one
unauthorized bid was disclosed, these violations might have been prevented. . . . The
supervisors were required to take action reasonably designed to prevent a repetition of
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release stressed that the board's inaction in that case allowed a corporate
officer implicated in the wrongdoing to issue a misleading release to the
marketplace. 120 There are many ways to ensure that no repetition of
alleged wrongful conduct occurs, but some mechanism must be selected,
and a basis must exist, for the board's assumption that that mechanism
will prevent any recurrence of the conduct in issue.
(c) Corporations should revisit their policies of indemnification and
advancement of expenses to employees accused or suspected of
significant wrongdoing. As a result of the takeover boom of the 1980s,
many corporations have taken advantage of Delaware law (or similar
laws in other jurisdictions) that permit companies to make advancement
of expenses and indemnification a matter of corporate contract. 121
Unfortunately, these provisions have a decidedly negative effect on
companies whose employees are subject to governmental inquiries.
We believe that corporations should be circumspect about advancing
the costs of defense to an employee who refuses to cooperate with either
the company or the government, or both, while nonetheless asserting his
or her innocence. There is no doubt that employees have the right to
assert their Fifth Amendment rights, but it cannot be gainsaid that the
corporation may be disadvantaged by the advancement of legal fees to
someone who is refusing to cooperate with regulatory and governmental
authorities, not to mention the company as well. Particularly in
regulated industries, such as the defense industry, or the broker-dealer
industry, criminal proceedings can lead to a loss of employment and a
loss of privileges for the corporation. 122
As a general proposition, employees who seek advancement of
expenses should be told that their expenses will be advanced provided
they agree to (1) cooperate fully with all relevant governmental and
corporate inquiries, (2) acknowledge for the corporation that they are not
aware of any unlawful acts they have committed, and (3) reimburse the

the misconduct that had been disclosed to them."). Mr. Pitt was counsel to Salomon's
then-General Counsel, Donald M. Feuerstein, in connection with this proceeding.
120. In re Cooper Companies, Inc., [1994-95 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ,i 85, 472, at 86,065 (Dec. 12, 1994).
121. See, e.g., General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (Supp.
1994).
122. See generally John T. Boese, Suspension and Debarment: A Primer for the
1990s, ACQUISITION ISSUES, June 1994, at I.
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company for any moneys advanced in the event they are convicted (or
plead guilty to) a criminal act.
·
VI.

THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR

A.

Background

Typically, institutional investors and their money managers have
avoided active participation in shareholder suits, for a variety ofreasons.
The Reform Act, however, changes the rules of the game, providing
institutional shareholders and securities counsel with both new challenges
and opportunities. Given the contours of the Reform Act, it is not clear
that institutional investors will always be able--0r should want-to sit
passively on the sidelines in battles between corporate issuers and
shareholders. By the same token, corporate issuers can no longer afford
to assume that their large institutional holders will--or will be able
to----stay out of the fray of shareholder litigation.
Prior to the Reform Act's adoption, institutional investors routinely
avoided assuming a leadership role in securities litigation. This was
relatively easy to do, because the old system made taking an active role
in class-action litigation procedurally difficult, economicall~ impracticable, and "politically" unwise for institutional investors. 1 3 Taking a
passive role in litigation against portfolio companies allowed institutions
to obtain some redress for their constituent shareholders, while remaining
on good terms with the issuer. 124 This passivity often resulted in
institutions, on average, recovering less than fifteen percent of their total
court-certified losses in class actions, while bearing most of the costs
associated with that litigation, at the same time that the plaintiffs'
lawyers in these actions received twenty-five to thirty-five percent off
the top of each recovery. 125

B.

Litigation Reform

Part of Congress' intent in adopting the Reform Act was to eliminate
figurehead plaintiffs who exercised no meaningful supervision of the

123. See, e.g., Keith Johnson, Assistant General Counsel, SWIB, Securities Class
Action Reform: A Real Client's Perspective, 1995 ABA Annual Meeting Section of
Business Law (copy on file with authors).
124. See generally Richard H. Koppes & Maureen L. Reilly, An Ounce of
Prevention: Meeting the Fiduciary Duty to Monitor an Index Fund Through Relationship Investing, 20 IOWA J. CORP. L. 414 (1995).
125. See Johnson, supra note 123, at I; see also CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note
11, at 3.
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litigation---0r even the decision to file suit-by attempting to encourage,
but not require, institutional shareholders to supervise this litigation, and
to select their own counsel whom these institutions would monitor and
supervise. 126 There are three principal facets to the reform Congress
effected.
First, when a class action is filed, the named plaintiff must give notice
to all members of the class, and any member of the class can seek leave
to serve as the lead plaintiff, with the court required to indulge a
rebuttable presumption that the shareholder with the largest economic
stake in the issues raised also is likely to be the "most adequate
plaintiff' class representative.
Second, once a lead plaintiff is selected, control over the hiring of
counsel falls to the lead plaintiff, subject to court approval. This will
enable the lead plaintiff to monitor counsel, to control the pace or
direction of litigation, and to be involved in the negotiation of any
settlement.
Finally, any proposed settlement agreement that is disseminated to the
class must set forth the amount that will be distributed to the class, in
both aggregate and average-per-share terms, and must allow the class to
compare that amount with the potential amount of damages both parties
believe each claim could have produced, along with a statement of
attorneys' fees and costs to be sought from the fund (if any) that will be
established.
C.

A Fiduciary Duty to Litigate?

Although some commentators have suggested that institutional
managers may have a fiduciary duty to cause their institutions to assume
the role of lead plaintiff in certain cases, or at least to make a considered
decision as to why they should not assume that role, 127 neither the
language of the Reform Act nor its legislative history imposes such a

CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 34.
See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring:
How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, I 04
126.
127.

YALE L.J. 2053, 2112 (1995) ("Consideration of their fiduciary obligations also may lead
many institutional investors to decide that they should seek to serve as lead plaintiff
whenever they are eligible to do so.").
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duty. In fact, Congress actually disclaimed such an intent. 128 Nonetheless, given that Congress stated that its specific intent was to
"encourage institutional investors to take a more active role in securities
class action lawsuits," 129 some might seek to imply a duty to litigate
from the existing fiduciary rules applicable to trustees and corporate
managers and, in some cases, the laws applicable to pension fund
managers and investment advisers.
The law of trusts, for example, imposes a duty on a trustee---akin to
the fund manager of an institution--not only to act prudently in the
investment and management of trust funds, but to "monitor[] and
review[] investments" and to "keep[] informed of rights and opportunities associated with those investments." 13 Further, a fiduciary to a
trust must "take reasonable steps to realize on claims" when the
"probable benefit to the trust will exceed the costs the trust reasonably
can expect to incur." 131 If, under the circumstances, the only reasonable step "would be to bring suit to enforce the claims, [the trustee] has
a duty to bring such suit." 132
General corporate law contains similar (although somewhat less
strenuous) fiduciary rules, requiring corporate managers to take steps
similar to those required of a trustee to protect corporate assets. 133
With respect to pension funds, the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) imposes rigorous fiduciary duties on fund
managers in connection with managing plan assets. 134 The Department
of Labor has stated that these duties extend to actively monitoring
situations where "such activities of the plan alone, or together with other
shareholders, are likely to enhance the value of the plan's investment,
after taking into account the costs involved." 135 Courts have held that

°

128. The legislative history states that the Reform Act should not confer any new
fiduciary duty on institutional investors, and urges courts not to impose such a duty.
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 34.
129. Id.
130. Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 127, at 2113 (quoting the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (1992)).
131. Id. (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS,§ 177 (1959)). Courts
have found trustees negligent for failure to monitor their internally-managed investments.
See, e.g., Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270, 276 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1072 (1984).
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § I 92 cmt. a. ( 1959); Weiss &
Beckerman, supra note 127, at 2113.
133. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 127, at 2113-14; see also General Rubber
Co. v. Benedict, 109 N.E. 96 (N.Y. 1915).
134. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 § 404(a)(l)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(l)(B) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
135. See Interpretive Bulletins Relating to ERISA, 59 Fed. Reg. 38,860, 38,862
(1994).
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fiduciaries of employee stock ownership plans have a duty to pursue
minority shareholder claims, and have imposed liability on plan
fiduciaries for failing to do so. 136 In addition, the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 has been interpreted to impose a duty on investment
advisers to act as fiduciaries with respect to their customers. 137
We do not believe the Reform Act imposes any obligation either to
conjure up litigation, or to partake in any particular case. Managers
ultimately may decide that a given action is meritless or exposes their
clients to too much risk or too little benefit. But, upon notification of
the existence of a claim, institutional money managers should consider,
deliberately and without self-interest, whether to undertake a more active
role in connection with such litigation.

D.

Practice Points

In this new environment, institutional investors and their money
managers may wish to consider the following possibilities to avoid
having their passivity criticized as a decision to forego an opportunity
to enhance investor returns.

1.

Litigation Monitoring Committees

Institutional money managers should consider establishing litigation
monitoring committees--either by themselves or in coordination with
other comparably situated money managers----to monitor class actions
filed against companies whose securities are held in the portfolios they
manage. While the composition of such a committee should reflect the
culture of the particular money manager and the institutional investor
involved, as a general rule, the committee should include someone
knowledgeable about securities litigation, who is well-versed in the legal
duties under which the money manager operates, and someone capable
of analyzing whether filed litigation has merit.

136. See, e.g., Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 667-68 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 1054 (1993).
137. See Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206, 15 U.S.C. § S0b-6(1994); SEC
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963); In re Arlene W. Hughes,
27 S.E.C. 34-4048 (1948).
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2.

Monitoring Existing and Future Litigation Opportunities

Litigation monitoring committees should review news and reports of
SEC and other governmental action affecting portfolio companies to
determine whether a cause of action may exist on behalf of the
institution's beneficiaries. They also should ensure that major publications are scanned regularly to pick up notices of new class action
lawsuits. Ongoing litigation involving portfolio companies also should
be monitored, because even cases not governed by the Reform Act can
be influenced by the changes the Reform Act has wrought in securities
litigation.
3.

Choosing Counsel in Advance

Many defense law firms previously took the position that they
represented only business clients, and usually only as defendants; these
firms would not represent a plaintiff class in an action against a
business. However, some of those firms have represented institutional
investors and money managers for decades and have begun seeking
assignments as counsel of choice in the event their clients (or someone
else's) should pursue appointment as lead plaintiff. 138 Given the
relatively short time frame within which a decision must be made to
seek appointment as a lead plaintiff, having knowledge of the lawyers
or law firms a manager would retain can avoid distractions during a
period when institutional managers will want to pay more attention to
the merits of the litigation.
4.

Recording the Committee's Deliberations and Activities

As a general proposition, we believe that it is important not only to do
the right thing, but also to be able to prove that the right thing was
done! To this end, institutional investors should keep a log of the suits
that they monitor and record, in summary fashion, the basis for their
decisions whether to become involved in litigation.

138. See Karen Donovan, Securities Defense Bar Soaks up Rays, Across Bay Bill
Lerach Chases Silicon Graphics, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 12, 1996, at Al; Karen Donovan,
Pension Managers Speaking Up: Institutional Investors Ready for Role in Class Action
Securities Suits, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 13, 1995, at A6 (reporting that Council oflnstitutional
Investors asked law firms to submit proposals describing how they could play a more
active role in class actions).
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5.

Minimizing the Committee's Burdens

Institutional managers understandably may be reluctant to expend a
great deal of time or resources on tracking all the class action litigation
filed that relates to companies whose securities they hold in their
institutional portfolios. It may make sense to ask counsel for the
putative plaintiff and the portfolio company to share with the institutional manager their basis for the claims and defenses they intend to assert,
and to indicate how the case will be established or defended, and what
factual proof exists. In this fashion, institutional managers can
(1) conserve their resources by relying on the good faith efforts of those
directly involved in the litigation, (2) maintain good relationships with
the management of the portfolio company by evidencing a willingness
to listen to management's side of things and to assess management's
defenses, and (3) justify a decision not to become involved in a
particular action, based either on management's defenses, plaintiffs'
counsel's evidence, or both.

6.

Coordinating With Other Institutional Investors

Even before the Reform Act, institutional investors had begun to
combine their efforts to influence class action lawsuits involving federal
securities claims. For example, in the spring of 1995, the Council of
Institutional Investors retained legal counsel to assist its members in
reviewing class actions and seeking greater involvement, after submitting
requests for proposals to many law firms known for their work
defending class action lawsuits. As a result of the Council's monitoring
efforts, the Colorado Public Employees Retirement Association filed a
motion to intervene in a lawsuit against California Micro Devices. 139
Participants in the Stanford Forum, a group of institutional investors that
meets yearly to discuss issues in which they have common interest, went
one step further, coordinating on a letter urging plaintiffs' counsel in a
class action lawsuit against Intel Corporation to reconsider whether the

139. See Diana B. Henriques, Market Place: A Class Action is Seen as a Dress
Rehearsal for New Securities Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1996, at D6; James M.
Finberg, Big Shareholders Back Micro Devices Settlement, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 4, 1995, at
Al8.
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claims had merit. 140 If going it alone is too burdensome, a group of
similarly situated parties can provide the vehicle for addressing fiduciary
responsibilities at minimal cost while minimizing the likelihood of
attacks on individual institutions.

7.

Using Leverage Early

An institutional investor who might be a credible candidate for lead
plaintiff (and who might choose its own counsel rather than counsel of
record) can negotiate the circumstances under which it would be willing
to forego that opportunity. Lower attorneys' fees, regular meetings of
plaintiffs monitoring the litigation, requiring the use of a plaintiffs'
steering committee to direct counsel during the litigation, and approval
of settlement agreements before they are presented to defendants--all of
these and more possibilities can be addressed by agreement among the
parties at the outset of the litigation.

8.

Participating in Settlement Discussions

If a lawsuit is filed, it behooves large investors to become "players,"
at least when any settlement discussions begin. In crafting settlements,
for example, there is often a disparity between the interests of former
shareholders and ongoing shareholders of a corporation. To the extent
institutional managers retain an investment in the target of litigation, it
is to their benefit to make their presence felt in settlement discussions,
in order to ensure that the terms of a settlement, and the proposed fees,
do not unfairly prejudice the interests of continuing shareholders.
Similarly, the active involvement of a major institutional investor can
assist corporate management in assessing the nature of class action
litigation and its likely impact on shareholders.

9.

Opting Out

Where proposed settlements are inadequate or otherwise are unfair,
consideration could be given to opting out of the litigation completely.
With the heightened notice requirements imposed by the Reform Act,
opting out has become a more realistic option. Institutional money
managers should be certain that opting out is consistent with their
fiduciary responsibilities, a conclusion more easily reached if a
simultaneous decision is made to pursue a different resolution with the
company.

140.
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10.

Disclosure Risks

Those petitioning to be lead plaintiff must disclose, in a certificate
attached to their complaint, their holdings and trading patterns in the
subject securities from prior years. 141 This may discourage institutional investors from serving as the initial named plaintiff on a class action
complaint. While movants seeking lead plaintiff status also must make
other various disclosures, Congress attempted to limit the burden on
institutional investors in this regard, permitting members of the purported
class to seek discovery on the adequacy of representation by the
presumptively most adequate plaintiff only if "the plaintiff first
demonstrates a reasonable basis for a finding that the presumptively most
adequate plaintiff is incapable of adequately representing the class." 142
Of course, the court may allow discovery of additional information
relevant to whether a member of the class is the most adequate plaintiff
once a "reasonable basis" is established, which may include the
petitioner's voting record, involvement with management, resources for
litigation costs, and the like. 143 Institutional investors and their
managers may prefer not to provide such information, to protect client
privacy interests or their own business confidentiality, and therefore may
conclude that the risks of service as lead plaintiff outweigh the potential

141. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-l (West Supp. 1996) (adding new§ 27(aX2)(A)(iv) to
the Securities Act); id. § 78u-4 (adding new § 21D(a)(2)(A)(iv) to the Exchange Act).
("Each plaintiff seeking to serve as a representative party on behalf of a class shall
provide a sworn certification ... set[ting] forth all of the transactions of the plaintiff in
the security that is the subject of the complaint during the class period specified in the
complaint.").
142. See id.§ 77z-l (adding new§ 27(a)(3)(B)(iv) to the Securities Act); id.§ 78u4 (adding new § 2 ID(a)(3)(B)(iv) to the Exchange Act). To be eligible for the "most
adequate plaintiff'' presumption, a plaintiff must "otherwise satisf(y] the requirements of
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. § 77z-l (adding new
§ 27(a)(3)(B)(iii) to the Securities Act); id. § 78u-4 (adding new § 2 ID(a)(3)(B)(iii) to
the Exchange Act). In addition to requiring "adequacy of representation," Rule 23
requires that the claims or defenses of the representative party be "typical" of the claims
or defenses of the class. See, e.g., Garonzik v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 574 F.2d
1220, 1221 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that an admission that the plaintiff was a "sophisticated investor raises a defense as to plaintiff's own claim which deprives him of the
typicality of the class required for class representation").
143. Cf ML-Lee Acquisition Fund II, L.P. Securities Litig., 149 F.R.D. 506 (D.
Del. 1993) (ordering the production of documents relating to the plaintiff's investment
history at the class certification stage).
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benefits. In this regard, joining forces with other institutional investors
may increase opportunities to influence litigation while reducing the
profile of particular institutions, thereby limiting the potential for
discovery exposure.

11.

Additional Costs

The Reform Act ratchets up the potential for parties to be required to
pay their opponents' attorneys' fees by requiring the court to make a
specific finding, at the conclusion of a class action, as to the compliance
of each party with the requirements of Rule ll(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure,1 44 and then presuming that the appropriate sanction
for violating Rule 11 is an award of attorneys' fees to the other
party. 145 Meanwhile, courts are showing less enthusiasm for affirming
settlements where the most significant percentage of the payout goes to
lawyers, rather than to the claimants. In this environment, serving as
plaintiffs' counsel may not hold the financial lure it once did.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The passage of the Reform Act was a product of a unique alignment
of political forces. Securities litigation has been an enduring concern on
Capitol Hill for years. The issue assumed greater prominence when it
became part of the Republican "Contract with America" which shaped
the l 04th Congress. This energized support for an issue that already had
attracted broad bipartisan interest. The issue came to the fore during the
tenure of an SEC Chairman who, while he did not lend unqualified
support for the entire bill, 146 was unique in his willingness to address

144. 15 U.S.C.A. § 77z-1 (West Supp. 1996) (adding new § 27(c)(l) to the
Securities Act); id. § 78u-4 (adding new§ 2ID(c)(l) to the Exchange Act).
145. See id.§ 77z-1 (adding new§ 27(c) to the Securities Act); id.§ 78u-4 (adding
new§ 21D(c) to the Exchange Act); CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 39. The
Act requires courts to adopt a presumption that an award of attorneys' fees is the
appropriate sanction for "failure of any responsive pleading or dispositive motion to
comply" and for "substantial failure of any complaint to comply" with Rule 11. 15
U.S.C.A. § 77z-1 (West Supp. 1996) (adding new§ 27(c)(3)(A) to the Securities Act);
id. § 78u-4 (adding new § 2ID(c)(3)(A) to the Exchange Act)(ernphasis added). A
complaint that violates Rule 11 will result in an award of attorneys' fees "incurred in the
action," whereas violation of Rule 11 on a responsive pleading or dispositive motion will
only result in an award of attorneys' fees incurred as a "direct result of the violation."

Id.
146. While Chairman Arthur Levitt stated, in a November 15, 1995 letter to Senate
Banking Committee Chairman Alfonse D' Amato that the safe harbor represents a
"workable balance," he emphasized, in a subsequent letter to the Los Angeles Times, that
an article was "wrong in reporting that I now support the litigation reform bill." See 141
CONG. REC. Sl7935, S17994 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1995).
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shortcomings in our present system of securities litigation. 147 In the
end, President Clinton's veto came too late. At the critical juncture, the
push to override the veto in the Senate was led by Senator Christopher
Dodd, the Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, and a cosponsor of the Reform Act. 148
For corporate counsel, the Reform Act generates the pragmatic
questions of implementation. Yet, for all the charges introduced by the
Reform Act, it is clear that shareholder litigation has not been eviscerated by the legislation. 149 To the extent that the federal forum becomes
less friendly, plaintiffs' counsel will be tempted to test the waters in state
courts and to retry this issue in state legislatures. Whatever the forum,
good corporate practices will be as important as ever in the wake of the
Reform Act.

147. See Remarks of SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt to the 22nd Annual Securities
Regulation Institute in San Diego, California, [I 994-95 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ,i 85,600, at 86,244 (Jan. 25, 1995).
148. See, e.g., Michael K. Frisby & Jeffrey Taylor, Senate Poised to Override
Securities Veto, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, I 995, at A3.
149. See, e.g., Mike France, Bye, Fraud Suits. Hello, Fraud Suits, Bus. WK., June
24, 1996, at 127 (noting that at least 35 companies have been sued in 1996 in securities
class action suits). The pace at which suits are being initiated has slowed. One survey
found that 20 companies were named in securities class action in the first quarter of
I 996 compared with 45 in the first quarter of I 995 and 55 in the first quarter of I 994.
(Survey results on file at the University of San Diego Law Review).
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